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Abstract
Several quantum process algebras have been proposed and successfully applied in verification of
quantum cryptographic protocols. All of the bisimulations proposed so far for quantum processes
in these process algebras are state-based, implying that they only compare individual quantum
states, but not a combination of them. This paper remedies this problem by introducing a novel
notion of distribution-based bisimulation for quantum processes. We further propose an approx-
imate version of this bisimulation that enables us to prove more sophisticated security properties
of quantum protocols which cannot be verified using the previous bisimulations. In particular,
we prove that the quantum key distribution protocol BB84 is sound and (asymptotically) secure
against the intercept-resend attacks by showing that the BB84 protocol, when executed with
such an attacker concurrently, is approximately bisimilar to an ideal protocol, whose soundness
and security are obviously guaranteed, with at most an exponentially decreasing gap.
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1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography can provide unconditional security; it allows the realisation of
cryptographic tasks that are proven or conjectured to be impossible in classical cryptography.
The security of quantum cryptographic protocols is mathematically provable, based on the
principles of quantum mechanics, without imposing any restrictions on the computational
capacity of attackers. The proof is, however, often notoriously difficult, which is evidenced
by the 50 pages long security proof of the quantum key distribution protocol BB84 [20].
It is hard to imagine such an analysis being carried out for more sophisticated quantum
protocols. Thus, techniques for (semi-)automated verification of quantum protocols will
be indispensable, given that quantum communication systems are already commercially
available.
Process algebra has been successfully applied in the verification of classical (non-quantum)
cryptographic protocols [21, 25]. One key step for such a process algebraic approach is a
suitable notion of bisimulation which has appropriate distinguishing power and is preserved by
various process constructs. Intuitively, two systems are bisimilar if and only if each observable
action of one of them can be simulated by the other by performing the same observable action
(possibly preceded and/or followed by some unobservable internal actions), and furthermore,
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the resultant systems are again bisimilar. To verify a cryptographic protocol, we first give a
specification which is an ideal protocol with obvious correctness and security, and then show
that the given protocol is bisimilar (or approximately bisimilar with a small perturbation) to
the specification.
In the last 10 years, several quantum process algebras like CQP [13], QPAlg [16] and
qCCS [10] have been introduced, which provide an intuitive but rigorous way to model
and reason about quantum communication systems. In particular, they have been adopted
in verification of several popular quantum communication protocols such as Teleportation,
Superdense Coding, etc. Similar to the classical case, the notion of bisimulation is crucial in the
process algebra-based verification of quantum protocols. Actually, several different versions of
bisimulation have been proposed for quantum processes in the recent literature [19, 27, 11, 5, 6].
A key feature of all of them is that they are state-based in the sense that they only compare
individual configurations but not a combination of them. More explicitly, they are defined to
be relations over configurations which are pairs of a quantum process and a density operator
describing the state of environment quantum systems. However, when distributions of
configurations are considered (which is inevitable for protocols where randomness is employed
or quantum measurement is involved), state-based bisimulations are too discriminative
– they distinguish some distributions which will never be distinguished by any outside
observers, thereby providing the potential attacker of a cryptographic protocol with unrealistic
power. As an extreme example, a state-based bisimulation distinguishes the distribution
p〈nil, ρ〉+ (1− p)〈nil, σ〉 from the single configuration 〈nil, pρ+ (1− p)σ〉 if ρ 6= σ, where
nil is the dead process incapable of performing any action.
In this paper, we propose a novel bisimulation for quantum processes which is defined
directly on distributions of quantum configurations. Compared with existing bisimulations
in the literature, our definition is strictly coarser (in particular, equates the two distributions
presented above) and takes into account the combination of accompanied quantum states.
We further define a pseudo-metric to characterise the extent to which two quantum processes
are bisimilar. Note that we only consider quantum processes written in qCCS, but the main
results can be generalised to other quantum process algebras like CQP and QPAlg easily.
To illustrate the utility of distribution-based bisimulation and the pseudo-metric in
verification of quantum cryptographic protocols, we analyse the soundness and security of
the well-known BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [4]. For the soundness, we show
that when executed alone (without the presence of an attacker), BB84 is bisimilar to an
ideal protocol which always returns a uniformly distributed (conditioning on a given key
size) key. For the security analysis, we prove that when BB84 is executed concurrently with
an intercept-resend attacker, the whole system is approximately bisimilar, with at most an
exponentially decreasing gap, to an ideal protocol which never reports failure or information
leakage. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time (a weak notion of) security of
BB84 is formally described and verified in the quantum process algebra approach.
Related works. The problem of existing bisimulations, as pointed out in the third
paragraph of this section, was also noted by Kubota et al. [17]. To deal with it, they
adopted two different semantics for quantum measurements. When a measurement induces
a probability distribution in which all configurations have the same observable actions, it
is represented semantically as a super-operator obtained by discarding the measurement
outcome (thus no probabilistic branching is produced, and all post-measurement quantum
states are merged). Otherwise, the measurement has the same semantics as in the original
qCCS. This treatment solves the problem when probabilistic behaviours are only induced by
quantum measurements. However, it does not work when probabilistic choice is included
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in the syntax level, as we do in describing BB84 protocol in this paper. Furthermore, it
brings difficulty in deciding the right semantics of a quantum process where a measurement
is involved, as determining if the observable actions of the post-measurement configurations
are all the same might not be easy; sometimes it even depends on the later input from the
environment. In this paper, we solve this problem by revising the definition of bisimulation,
instead of the definition of semantics.
In the same paper [17], Kubota et al. applied qCCS (with the semantic modification
mentioned above) to show the security of BB84. They proved that BB84 is bisimilar to an
EDP-based protocol, following the proof of Shor and Preskill [26]. However, this should
not be regarded as a complete security proof, as it relies on the security of the EDP-based
protocol. In contrast, our approach shows the security of BB84 directly. Note that for this
purpose, a notion of approximate bisimulation, which was not presented in [17], is necessary,
as BB84 is secure only in the sense that the eavesdropper’s information about the secure key
obtained by the legitimate parties is arbitrarily small (but still can be strictly positive) when
the number of qubits transmitted (called the security parameter) goes to infinity.
Software tools based on the quantum process algebra CQP have been developed in [2]
and [3] to check the equivalence between quantum sequential programs as well as concurrent
protocols. These tools were applied to verify the correctness of protocols like Teleportation,
Bit Flip Error Correction Code, and Quantum Secret Sharing. However, verification of
security properties in cryptographic protocols such as BB84 has not been reported yet.
Besides the process algebra approach, model-checking is another promising approach
for verification of quantum cryptographic protocols. For example, by observing the fact
that the quantum states appearing in BB84, when only intercept-resend eavesdroppers are
considered, are all the so-called stabiliser states which can be efficiently encoded in a classical
way, Nagarajan et al. [22] analysed the security of BB84 by using the probabilistic model
checker PRISM [18].
2 Preliminaries
In this section we review the model of probabilistic labelled transition systems (pLTSs) and
the notion of lifted relations. Later on we will interpret the behaviour of quantum processes
in terms of pLTSs.
2.1 Probabilistic labelled transition systems
A (finite-support) probability distribution over a set S is a function µ : S → [0, 1] with
µ(s) > 0 for finitely many s ∈ S and ∑s∈S µ(s) = 1; the support of such a µ is the set
dµe = { s ∈ S | µ(s) > 0 }. The point distribution s assigns probability 1 to s and 0 to
all other elements of S, so that dse = {s}. We use D(S) to denote the set of probability
distributions over S, ranged over by µ, ν etc. If
∑
i∈I pi = 1 for some collection of pi ≥ 0,
and µi ∈ D(S), then
∑
i∈I pi · µi ∈ D(S) is a combined probability distribution with
(
∑
i∈I pi · µi)(s) =
∑
i∈I pi · µi(s). We always assume the index set I to be finite.
I Definition 1. A probabilistic labelled transition system (pLTS) is a triple 〈S,Act,−→〉,
where S is a set of states, Act is a set of transition labels with a special element τ included,
and the transition relation −→ is a subset of S × Act×D(S).
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2.2 Lifting relations
In a pLTS actions are only performed by states, in that they are given by relations from
states to distributions. But in general we allow distributions over states to perform an action.
For this purpose, we lift these relations to distributions [7, 6].
I Definition 2 (Lifting). Let R ⊆ S ×D(S) be a relation. The lifted relation, denoted by R
again for simplicity, is the smallest relation R ⊆ D(S)×D(S) that satisfies
1. sRν implies sRν, and
2. (Linearity) µiRνi for i ∈ I implies (
∑
i∈I pi · µi)R(
∑
i∈I pi · νi) for any pi ∈ [0, 1] with∑
i∈I pi = 1.
We apply this operation to the relations α−→ in a pLTS for α ∈ Act. Thus as source of a
relation α−→ we also allow distributions. But s α−→ µ is more general than s α−→ µ, because
if s α−→ µ then there is a collection of distributions µi and probabilities pi such that s α−→ µi
for each i ∈ I and µ = ∑i∈I pi · µi with ∑i∈I pi = 1; that is, we allow different transitions
to be combined together, provided that they have the same source s and the same label α.
Sometimes we also need to lift a relation on states, say a state-based bisimulation, to
distributions. This can be done by the following two steps. Let R ⊆ S × S be such
a relation. First, it induces a relation Rˆ ⊆ S × D(S) between states and distributions:
Rˆ := {(s, t) | sRt}. Then we can use Definition 2 to lift Rˆ to distributions. Note that when
R is an equivalence relation over S, the lifted relation over D(S) coincides with the lifting
defined in [15].
In Definition 2, linearity tells us how to compare two linear combinations of distributions.
Sometimes we need a dual notion of decomposition. Intuitively, if a relation R is left-
decomposable and µRν, then for any decomposition of µ there exists some corresponding
decomposition of ν.
I Definition 3 (Left-decomposable). A binary relation over distributions, R ⊆ D(S)×D(S),
is called left-decomposable if (
∑
i∈I pi · µi)Rν implies that ν can be written as (
∑
i∈I pi · νi)
such that µiRνi for every i ∈ I.
The next lemma shows that any lifted relation is left-decomposable.
I Lemma 4 ([6]). For any R ⊆ S ×D(S) or S × S, the lifted relation over distributions is
left-decomposable.
With the help of lifted relations, we are now able to define various (weak) transitions
between distributions for a pLTS.
I Definition 5. Given a pLTS 〈S,Act,−→〉, we define the following transitions over distri-
butions:
1. τˆ−→. Let s τˆ−→ µ if either s τ−→ µ or µ = s, and lift it to distributions;
2. αˆ−→ for α 6= τ . Let s αˆ−→ µ if s α−→ µ, and lift it to distributions;
3. τˆ=⇒. Let τˆ=⇒ = ( τˆ−→)∗ be the reflexive and transitive closure of τˆ−→;
4. αˆ=⇒ for α 6= τ . Let αˆ=⇒ = τˆ=⇒ αˆ−→ τˆ=⇒. For point distributions, we often write s αˆ=⇒ ν
instead of s αˆ=⇒ ν.
Note that here αˆ=⇒ is not a lifted transition. However, the next lemma shows that it is
still both linear and left-decomposable.
I Lemma 6 ([6]). The transition relations αˆ=⇒ are both linear and left-decomposable.
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3 qCCS: Syntax and Semantics
In this section, we review the syntax and semantics of qCCS, a quantum extension of
value-passing CCS introduced in [10, 27], and a notion of state-based bisimulation for qCCS
processes presented in [6]. We assume the readers are familiar with the basic notions in
quantum information theory; for those who are not, please refer to [23].
3.1 Syntax
We assume three types of data in qCCS: Bool for booleans, real numbers Real for classical
data, and qubits Qbt for quantum data. Let cVar , ranged over by x, y, . . . , be the set of
classical variables, and qVar , ranged over by q, r, . . . , the set of quantum variables. It is
assumed that cVar and qVar are both countably infinite. We assume a set Exp, which
includes cVar as a subset and is ranged over by e, e′, . . . , of classical expressions over Real,
and a set of boolean-valued expressions BExp, ranged over by b, b′, . . . , with the usual set of
boolean operators tt, ff, ¬, ∧, ∨, and →. In particular, we let e ./ e′ be a boolean expression
for any e, e′ ∈ Exp and ./ ∈ {>,<,≥,≤,=}. We further assume that only classical variables
can occur free in data expressions and boolean expressions. Let cChan be the set of classical
channel names, ranged over by c, d, . . . , and qChan the set of quantum channel names, ranged
over by c, d, . . . . Let Chan = cChan∪qChan. A relabeling function f is a one-to-one function
from Chan to Chan such that f(cChan) ⊆ cChan and f(qChan) ⊆ qChan.
We often abbreviate the indexed set {q1, . . . , qn} to q˜ when q1, . . . , qn are distinct quantum
variables and the dimension n is understood. Sometimes we also use q˜ to denote the string
q1 . . . qn. We assume a set of process constant schemes, ranged over by A,B, . . . . Assigned to
each process constant scheme A there are two non-negative integers arc(A) and arq(A). If x˜
is a tuple of classical variables with |x˜| = arc(A), and q˜ a tuple of distinct quantum variables
with |q˜| = arq(A), then A(x˜, q˜) is called a process constant. When arc(A) = arq(A) = 0, we
also denote by A the (unique) process constant produced by A.
The syntax of qCCS terms can be given by the Backus-Naur form as
t ::= nil | A(e˜, q˜) | α.t | t+ t | t‖t | t\L | t[f ] | if b then t
α ::= τ | c?x | c!e | c?q | c!q | E [q˜] | M [q˜;x]
where c ∈ cChan, x ∈ cVar , c ∈ qChan, q ∈ qVar , q˜ ⊆ qVar , e ∈ Exp, e˜ ⊆ Exp, τ is the
silent action, A is a process constant scheme, f is a relabeling function, L ⊆ Chan, b ∈ BExp,
E and M are respectively a super-operator and a quantum measurement applying on the
Hilbert space associated with the systems q˜.
To exclude quantum processes which are not physically implementable, we also require
q 6∈ qv(t) in c!q.t and qv(t) ∩ qv(u) = ∅ in t‖u, where for a process term t, qv(t) is the
set of its free quantum variables which are not bound by quantum input c?q. The notion
of free classical variables in quantum processes can be defined in the usual way with the
only modification that the quantum measurement prefix M [q˜;x] has binding power on x. A
quantum process term t is closed if it contains no free classical variables, i.e., fv(t) = ∅. We
let T , ranged over by t, u, · · · , be the set of all qCCS terms, and P , ranged over by P,Q, · · · ,
the set of closed terms. To complete the definition of qCCS syntax, we assume that for
each process constant A(x˜, q˜), there is a defining equation A(x˜, q˜) := t where fv(t) ⊆ x˜ and
qv(t) ⊆ q˜. Throughout the paper we implicitly assume the convention that process terms are
identified up to α-conversion.
The process constructs we give here are quite similar to those in classical CCS, and
they also have similar intuitive meanings: nil stands for a process which does not perform
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any action; c?x and c!e are respectively classical input and classical output, while c?q and
c!q are their quantum counterparts. E [q˜] denotes the action of performing the quantum
operation E on the qubits q˜ while M [q˜;x] measures the qubits q˜ according to M and stores
the measurement outcome into the classical variable x. + models nondeterministic choice:
t + u behaves like either t or u depending on the choice of the environment. ‖ denotes
the usual parallel composition. The operators \L and [f ] model restriction and relabeling,
respectively: t\L behaves like t but any action through the channels in L is forbidden, and
t[f ] behaves like t where each channel name is replaced by its image under the relabeling
function f . Finally, if b then t is the standard conditional choice where t can be executed
only if b evaluates to tt.
An evaluation ψ is a function from cVar to Real; it can be extended in an obvious way
to functions from Exp to Real and from BExp to {tt,ff}, and finally, from T to P. For
simplicity, we still use ψ to denote these extensions. Let ψ{v/x} be the evaluation which
differs from ψ only in that it maps x to v.
3.2 Transitional semantics
For each quantum variable q ∈ qVar , we assume a 2-dimensional Hilbert space Hq to be the
state space of the q-system. For any V ⊆ qVar , we denote HV =
⊗
q∈V Hq. In particular,
H = HqVar is the state space of the whole environment consisting of all the quantum variables.
Note that H is a countably-infinite dimensional Hilbert space. For any V ⊆ qVar we denote
by V the complement set of V in qVar .
Suppose P is a closed quantum process. A pair of the form 〈P, ρ〉 is called a configuration,
where ρ ∈ D(H) is a density operator on H.1 The set of configurations is denoted by Con,
and ranged over by C,D, . . . . Let
Act = {τ} ∪ {c?v, c!v | c ∈ cChan, v ∈ Real} ∪ {c?r, c!r | c ∈ qChan, r ∈ qVar}.
For each α ∈ Act, we define the bound quantum variables qbv(α) of α as qbv(c?r) = {r} and
qbv(α) = ∅ if α is not a quantum input. The channel names used in action α is denoted by
cn(α); that is, cn(c?v) = cn(c!v) = {c}, cn(c?r) = cn(c!r) = {c}, and cn(τ) = ∅. We also
extend the relabelling function to Act in an obvious way. Then the transitional semantics
of qCCS can be given by a pLTS 〈Con,Act,−→〉, where −→ ⊆ Con × Act×D(Con) is the
smallest relation satisfying the inference rules depicted in Fig. 1. The symmetric forms for
rules Par, ComC , ComQ, and Sum are omitted. We abuse the notation slightly by writing
C α−→ D if C α−→ D. We also use the obvious extension of the function ‖ on configurations
to distributions. To be precise, if µ =
∑
i∈I pi〈Pi, ρi〉 then µ‖Q denotes the distribution∑
i∈I pi〈Pi‖Q, ρi〉. Similar extension applies to µ[f ] and µ\L.
3.3 State-based bisimulation
In this subsection, we recall the basic definitions and properties of the state-based bisimulation
introduced in [6]. Let C = 〈P, ρ〉 be a configuration and E a super-operator. We denote
qv(C) = qv(P ), env(C) = trqv(P )(ρ) being the quantum environment of process P in C, and
E(C) = 〈P, E(ρ)〉. Furthermore, for distribution µ = ∑i piCi with pi > 0 for each i, we write
qv(µ) =
⋃
i qv(Ci), env(µ) =
∑
i pi · env(Ci), and E(µ) =
∑
i piE(Ci). For any V ⊆ qVar ,
denote by SO(HV ) the set of super-operators on HV .
1 As H is infinite dimensional, ρ should be understood as a density operator on some finite dimensional
subspace of H which contains Hqv(P ).
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Tau
〈τ.P, ρ〉 τ−→ 〈P, ρ〉
InpC
v ∈ Real
〈c?x.t, ρ〉 c?v−→ 〈t{v/x}, ρ〉
OutC
v = [[e]]
〈c!e.P, ρ〉 c!v−→ 〈P, ρ〉
InpQ
r 6∈ qv(c?q.P )
〈c?q.P, ρ〉 c?r−→ 〈P{r/q}, ρ〉
OutQ
〈c!q.P, ρ〉 c!q−→ 〈P, ρ〉
Oper
〈E[r˜].P, ρ〉 τ−→ 〈P, Er˜(ρ)〉
Meas
M =
∑
i∈I λiE
i, pi = tr(Eir˜ρ) > 0
〈M [r˜; x].P, ρ〉 τ−→
∑
i∈I pi〈P{λi/x}, E
i
r˜ρE
i
r˜/pi〉
Par
〈P1, ρ〉 α−→ µ, qbv(α) ∩ qv(P2) = ∅
〈P1‖P2, ρ〉 α−→ µ‖P2
ComC
〈P1, ρ〉 c?v−→ 〈P ′1, ρ〉, 〈P2, ρ〉
c!v−→ 〈P ′2, ρ〉
〈P1‖P2, ρ〉 τ−→ 〈P ′1‖P ′2, ρ〉
ComQ
〈P1, ρ〉 c?r−→ 〈P ′1, ρ〉, 〈P2, ρ〉
c!r−→ 〈P ′2, ρ〉
〈P1‖P2, ρ〉 τ−→ 〈P ′1‖P ′2, ρ〉
Sum
〈P, ρ〉 α−→ µ
〈P +Q, ρ〉 α−→ µ
Rel
〈P, ρ〉 α−→ µ
〈P [f ], ρ〉 f(α)−→ µ[f ]
Cho
〈P, ρ〉 α−→ µ, [[b]] = tt
〈if b then P, ρ〉 α−→ µ
Res
〈P, ρ〉 α−→ µ, cn(α) ∩ L = ∅
〈P\L, ρ〉 α−→ µ\L
Def
〈t{v˜/x˜, r˜/q˜}, ρ〉 α−→ µ, A(x˜, q˜) := t, v˜ = [[e˜]]
〈A(e˜, r˜), ρ〉 α−→ µ
Figure 1 Transitional semantics of qCCS.
I Definition 7. A relation R ⊆ Con × Con is closed under super-operator application if
CRD implies E(C)RE(D) for all E ∈ SO(H
qv(C)∪qv(D)). More generally, a relation R ⊆
D(Con)×D(Con) is closed under super-operator application if µRν implies E(µ)RE(ν) for
all E ∈ SO(H
qv(µ)∪qv(ν)).
I Definition 8.
1. A symmetric relation R ⊆ Con × Con is called a state-based ground bisimulation if CRD
implies that
(i) qv(C) = qv(D), and env(C) = env(D),
(ii) whenever C α−→ µ, there exists ν such that D αˆ=⇒ ν and µRν.
2. A relation R is a state-based bisimulation if it is a state-based ground bisimulation, and
is closed under super-operator application.
3. Two quantum configurations C and D are state-based bisimilar, denoted by C ≈s D, if
there exists a state-based bisimulation R such that CRD;
4. Two quantum process terms t and u are state-based bisimilar, denoted by t ≈s u, if for
any quantum state ρ ∈ D(H) and any evaluation ψ, 〈tψ, ρ〉 ≈s 〈uψ, ρ〉.
Note that in Clause 1.(ii) of the above definition, µRν means µ and ν are related by the
relation lifted from R. The following theorem is taken from [6].
I Theorem 9.
1. The bisimilarity relation ≈s is the largest state-based bisimulation on Con, and it is an
equivalence relation.
2. As a lifted relation on D(Con), ≈s is both linear and left-decomposable.
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4 Distribution-based bisimulation
Note that in [8], it has already been shown by examples that state-based bisimulation is
sometimes too discriminative for probabilistic automata. These examples certainly work for
quantum processes as well. Furthermore, as the following example indicates, the problem
becomes more serious in the quantum setting, as the accompanied quantum states can and
should be combined when simulating each other.
I Example 10. Let M = λ0|0〉〈0| + λ1|1〉〈1| be a two-outcome measurement according
to the computational basis, and E a super-operator with the Kraus operators being |0〉〈0|
and |1〉〈1|. Let ρ be a density operator on H{q}, and C := 〈M [q;x].nil, |+〉q〈+| ⊗ ρ〉 and
D := 〈E [q].nil, |+〉q〈+| ⊗ ρ〉 be two configurations where |+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/
√
2. Note that in
the process M [q;x].nil, the measurement outcome is never used (as x 6∈ fv(nil)), while the
effect of E [q] is exactly measuring the system q according toM , but ignoring the measurement
outcome. Thus we definitely would like to regard C and D as being bisimilar2.
However, we can show that C 6≈s D. Let C0 = 〈nil, |0〉q〈0| ⊗ ρ〉, C1 = 〈nil, |1〉q〈1| ⊗ ρ〉,
CI = 〈nil, Iq/2 ⊗ ρ〉, and µ = 12C0 + 12C1. Then obviously µ 6≈s CI , as otherwise by the
left-decompositivity of ≈s we must have both C0 ≈s CI and C1 ≈s CI , which is impossible.
Actually, the argument in Example 10 applies to any bisimulation which is state-based:
by Lemma 4, any bisimilation between distributions which is lifted from configurations is
left-decomposable, hence discriminating C and D. Therefore, to make these two obviously
indistinguishable configurations bisimilar, we have to define bisimulation relation directly on
distributions, rather than on configurations and then lift it to distributions.
For this purpose, we extend the distribution-based bisimulation introduced in [9] to our
quantum setting. A distribution µ is said to be transition consistent, if for any C ∈ dµe
and α 6= τ , C αˆ=⇒ νC for some νC implies µ αˆ=⇒ ν for some ν, i.e., all configurations in its
support have the same set of enabled visible actions (possibly after some invisible transitions).
Furthermore, a decomposition µ =
∑
i∈I pi · µi, pi > 0 for each i ∈ I, is a tc-decomposition
of µ if for each i ∈ I, µi is transition consistent.
I Definition 11.
1. A symmetric relation R ⊆ D(Con) × D(Con) is called a (distribution-based) ground
bisimulation if for any µ, ν ∈ D(Con), µRν implies that
(i) qv(µ) = qv(ν), and env(µ) = env(ν),
(ii) whenever µ αˆ−→ µ′, there exists ν′ such that ν αˆ=⇒ ν′ and µ′Rν′,
(iii) if µ is not transition consistent, and µ =
∑
i∈I pi · µi is a tc-decomposition, then
ν
τˆ=⇒∑i∈I pi · νi such that for each i, µiRνi.
2. A relation R is a (distribution-based) bisimulation if it is a ground bisimulation, and is
closed under super-operator application.
In contrast with Definition 8.1, the above definition has an additional requirement Clause
1.(iii). This clause is crucial for distribution-based bisimulation, as the transition µ αˆ−→ µ′ in
Clause 1.(ii) is possible only when µ is transition consistent for α. That is, all configurations
in the support of µ can perform weak α-transition. For those actions for which µ is not
2 Note that C and D would be regarded as ‘semantically identical’ in [17], instead of ‘(distribution-based)
bisimilar’ as we do in this paper, since the semantics of M [q;x] in this case is represented as E [q] by
definition.
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transition consistent, we must first split µ into transition consistent components, and then
compare them with the corresponding components of ν individually.
The bisimilarity ≈ for quantum configurations and for quantum process terms are defined
similarly as in the state-based case. The next theorem collects some useful properties of the
distribution-based bisimilarity.
I Theorem 12.
1. The bisimilarity relation ≈ is the largest bisimulation on D(Con), and it is an equivalence
relation.
2. ≈ is linear, but not left-decomposable.
A direct consequence of Theorem 12 is a deciding algorithm for the bisimilarity between
recursion-free quantum configurations, which is sufficient for most practical quantum crypto-
graphic protocols. First, as pointed out in [12], any recursion-free quantum processes can be
modified to be free of quantum input, so that the bisimilarity between them can be verified
by only examining the ground bisimulation. Second, it has been proved in [14, Lemma 1]
that every linear bisimulation R corresponds to a matrix E, so that two distributions µ and
ν are related by R if and only if (µ− ν)E = 0, where distributions are seen as vectors. As
our ground bisimulation for quantum processes is indeed linear, the algorithm presented
in [14], with slight changes, can be used to decide it. For the sake of space limit, we omit the
details here, and refer interested readers to [14].
To conclude this section, we would like to show that our distribution-based bisimulation
is weaker than its state-based counterpart presented in Definition 8.
I Theorem 13. Let µ, ν ∈ D(Con). Then µ ≈s ν implies µ ≈ ν, but µ ≈ ν does not
necessarily imply µ ≈s ν. In particular, we have in Example 10 that µ ≈ CI and C ≈ D.
5 Bisimulation metric
In the previous section, only exact bisimulation is presented where two quantum processes
are either bisimilar or non-bisimilar. Obviously, such a bisimulation cannot capture the
idea that a quantum process approximately implements its specification. To measure the
behavioural distance between processes, the notion of approximate bisimulation and the
bisimulation distance for qCCS processes were introduced in [27]. This section is devoted to
extending this approximate bisimulation to distribution-based case. Note that approximate
bisimulation has been investigated in probabilistic process algebra and probabilistic labelled
transition systems in the context of security analysis [24, 1].
Recall that the trace distance of ρ, σ ∈ D(H) is defined to be d(ρ, σ) = 12‖ρ− σ‖tr where
‖ · ‖tr denotes the trace norm. We have the following definition.
I Definition 14. Given λ ∈ [0, 1], a symmetric relation R over D(Con) which is closed under
super-operator application is a λ-bisimulation if for any µRν, we have
1. qv(µ) = qv(ν), and d(env(µ), env(ν)) ≤ λ,
2. whenever µ αˆ−→ µ′, there exists ν′ such that ν αˆ=⇒ ν′ and µ′Rν′,
3. if µ is not transition consistent, and µ =
∑
i∈I pi · µi is a tc-decomposition, then
ν
τˆ=⇒∑i∈I pi · νi such that ∑i:µiRνi pi ≥ 1− λ.
By induction, we can show easily that µ αˆ−→ µ′ can be replaced by µ αˆ=⇒ µ′ in Clause (2).
The approximate bisimilarity λ≈ for quantum configurations and for quantum process terms
are defined similarly as in the exact bisimulation case. Furthermore, we define the bisimulation
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distance between distributions as db(µ, ν) = inf{λ ≥ 0 | µ λ≈ ν} and the bisimulation distance
between process terms as db(t, u) = inf{λ ≥ 0 | ∀ψ and ρ ∈ D(H), 〈tψ, ρ〉 λ≈ 〈uψ, ρ〉}. Here
we assume that inf ∅ = 1. The next theorem shows that db is indeed a pseudo-metric with ≈
being its kernel.
I Theorem 15.
1. The bisimulation distance db is a pseudo-metric on D(Con).
2. For any µ, ν ∈ D(Con), µ ≈ ν if and only if db(µ, ν) = 0.
6 An illustrative example
For the ease of notations, we extend the syntax of qCCS a little bit by allowing probabilistic
choice in the syntax level3; that is, we assume
∑
i∈I piti ∈ T whenever ti ∈ T and pi ≥ 0
for each i ∈ I with ∑i∈I pi = 1. We further extend the transitional semantics in Fig. 1 by
adding the following transition rule:
Dist 〈∑i∈I piti, ρ〉 τ−→∑i∈I pi〈ti, ρ〉 .
We also introduce the syntax sugar if b then t else u to be the abbreviation of if b then t +
if ¬b then u.
BB84, the first quantum key distribution protocol developed by Bennett and Brassard in
1984 [4], provides a provably secure way to create a private key between two parties, say,
Alice and Bob, with the help of a classical authenticated channel and a quantum insecure
channel between them. Its security relies on the basic property of quantum mechanics that
information gain about a quantum state is only possible at the expense of changing the
state, if all the possible states are not orthogonal. The basic BB84 protocol with security
parameter n goes as follows:
(1) Alice randomly generates two strings B˜a and K˜a of bits, each with size n.
(2) Alice prepares a string of qubits q˜, with size n, such that the ith qubit of q˜ is |xy〉
where x and y are the ith bits of B˜a and K˜a, respectively, and |00〉 = |0〉, |01〉 = |1〉,
|10〉 = |+〉, and |11〉 = |−〉. Here |+〉 := (|0〉+ |1〉)/
√
2 and |−〉 := (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2.
(3) Alice sends the qubit string q˜ to Bob.
(4) Bob randomly generates a string of bits B˜b with size n.
(5) Bob measures each qubit received from Alice according to a basis determined by the
bits he generated: if the ith bit of B˜b is k then he measures with {|k0〉, |k1〉}, k = 0, 1.
Let the measurement results be K˜b, again a string of bits with size n.
(6) Bob sends his measurement bases B˜b back to Alice, and upon receiving the information,
Alice sends her bases B˜a to Bob.
(7) Alice and Bob determine at which positions the bit strings B˜a and B˜b are equal. They
discard the bits in K˜a and K˜b where the corresponding bits of B˜a and B˜b do not match.
After the execution of the basic BB84 protocol above, the remaining bits of K˜a and K˜b,
denoted by K˜ ′a and K˜ ′b respectively, should be the same, provided that the channels used are
perfect, and no eavesdropper exists.
To detect a potential eavesdropper Eve, Alice and Bob proceed as follows:
3 Note that this extension will not change the expressive power of qCCS and all the results obtained in
this paper, as probabilistic choices can be simulated by quantum measurements preceded by appropriate
quantum state preparation.
Y. Feng and M. Ying 451
(8) Alice randomly chooses d|K˜ ′a|/2e bits of K˜ ′a, denoted by K˜ ′′a , and sends to Bob K˜ ′′a and
its indexes in K˜ ′a.
(9) Upon receiving the information from Alice, Bob sends back to Alice his substring K˜ ′′b
of K˜ ′b at the indexes received from Alice.
(10) Alice and Bob check if the strings K˜ ′′a and K˜ ′′b are equal. If yes, then the remaining
substring K˜fa (resp. K˜
f
b ) of K˜ ′a (resp. K˜ ′b) by deleting K˜ ′′a (resp. K˜ ′′b ) is the secure key
shared by Alice (reps. Bob). Otherwise, an eavesdropper (or too much noise in the
channels) is detected, and the protocol halts without generating any secure keys.
For simplicity, we omit the processes of information reconciliation and privacy amplifica-
tion. Now we describe the basic BB84 protocol [Steps (1)–(7)] in qCCS as follows.
Alice(n) :=
∑
B˜a,K˜a∈{0,1}n
1
22nSetK˜a [q˜].HB˜a [q˜].A2B!q˜.WaitA(B˜a, K˜a)
WaitA(B˜a, K˜a) := b2a?B˜b.a2b!B˜a.keya!cmp(K˜a, B˜a, B˜b).nil
Bob(n) := A2B?q˜.
∑
B˜b∈{0,1}n
1
2nMB˜b [q˜; K˜b].Set0˜[q˜].b2a!B˜b.WaitB(B˜b, K˜b)
WaitB(B˜b, K˜b) := a2b?B˜a.keyb!cmp(K˜b, B˜a, B˜b).nil
BB84 (n) := Alice(n)‖Bob(n)
where SetK˜a [q˜] sets the ith qubit of q˜ to the state |K˜a(i)〉, HB˜a [q˜] applies H or does nothing
on the ith qubit of q˜ depending on whether the ith bit of B˜a is 1 or 0, and MB˜b [q˜; K˜b] is the
quantum measurement on q˜ according to the bases determined by B˜b, i.e., for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
it measures qi with respect to the basis {|0〉, |1〉} (resp. {|+〉, |−〉}) if B˜b(i) = 0 (resp. 1),
and stores the result into K˜b(i). The function cmp takes a triple of bit-strings x˜, y˜, z˜ with
the same size as inputs, and returns the substring of x˜ where the corresponding bits of y˜
and z˜ match. When y˜ and z˜ match nowhere, we let cmp(x˜, y˜, z˜) = , the empty string. We
add the operation Set0˜[q˜] in Bob(n) for technical reasons: it makes the ideal specifications
defined below simple.
To show the correctness of basic BB84 protocol, we first put BB84 (n) in a test environment
defined as follows
Test := keya?ka.keyb?kb.if ka = kb then key!ka.nil else fail!0.nil
BB84test(n) := (BB84 (n)‖Test)\{a2b, b2a,A2B, keya, keyb}
For the ideal specification of BB84test(n), we would like it to satisfy the following three
conditions: (1) it is correct, in the sense that it will never perform fail!0; (2) the generated
key x˜ with |x˜| = i is uniformly distributed for each i ≤ n. That is, for any x˜ with |x˜| = i,
Pr(x˜ is the key obtained | key-length = i) = 1/2i; (3) The length of the obtained key follows
the unbiased binomial distribution. That is, for each i ≤ n, Pr(key-length = i) = (ni)/2n.
Thus we can let
BB84spec(n) :=
n∑
i=0
∑
x˜∈{0,1}i
(
n
i
)
2n+iSet0˜[q˜].key!x˜.nil.
It is tedious but routine to check that BB84test(n) ≈ BB84 spec(n) for any n.
Now we proceed to describe the protocol that detects potential eavesdroppers [Steps
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(1)–(10)]. Let
Alice′(n) := (Alice(n)‖keya?K˜ ′a.
|x˜|=k∑
x˜⊆{1,...,m}
1(
m
k
)a2b!x˜.a2b!SubStr(K˜ ′a, x˜).b2a?K˜ ′′b .
(if SubStr(K˜ ′a, x˜) = K˜ ′′b then key′a!RemStr(K˜ ′a, x˜).nil))\{keya}
Bob′(n) := (Bob(n)‖keyb?K˜ ′b.a2b?x˜.a2b?K˜ ′′a .b2a!SubStr(K˜ ′b, x˜).
(if SubStr(K˜ ′b, x˜) = K˜ ′′a then key′b!RemStr(K˜ ′b, x˜).nil))\{keyb}
BB84 ′(n) := Alice′(n)‖Bob′(n)
where m = |K˜ ′a| and k = dm/2e, the function SubStr(K˜ ′a, x˜) returns the substring of K˜ ′a at
the indexes specified by x˜, and RemStr(K˜ ′a, x˜) returns the remaining substring of K˜ ′a by
deleting SubStr(K˜ ′a, x˜).
To get a taste of the security of BB84 protocol, we consider a special case where Eve’s
strategy is to simply measure the qubits sent by Alice, according to randomly guessed bases,
to get the keys and resend these qubits to Bob. That is, we define
Eve(n) := A2E?q˜.
∑
B˜e∈{0,1}n
1
2nMB˜e [q˜; K˜e].key
′
e!K˜e.E2B!q˜.nil
Again, we put BB84 ′(n) in a test environment, but now the environment includes the
presence of Eve:
Test′ := key′a?x˜.key′b?y˜.key′e?z˜.(if x˜ 6= y˜ then fail!0.nil
else (if x˜ = z˜ then hacked!0.nil))
BB84 ′test(n) := (Alice′(n)[fa]‖Bob′(n)[fb]‖Eve(n)‖Test′)\L
where L = {a2b, b2a,A2E,E2B, key′a, key′b, key′e}, fa(A2B) = A2E, and fb(A2B) = E2B.
Now, to show the security of BB84,4 it suffices to prove the following property:
BB84 ′test(n)
cn≈ Set0˜[q˜].nil (1)
where c = 1/2 +
√
3/4 < 1. Thus db(BB84 ′test(n), Set0˜[q˜].nil) ≤ cn. That is, the testing
system is just like a protocol which only sets the quantum qubits q˜ to |0˜〉〈0˜|. As the process
Set0˜[q˜].nil never performs fail!0 or hacked!0, this indicates that the insecurity degree of BB84
is at most cn, which decreases exponentially to 0 when n tends to infinity.
To show Eq.(1), take arbitrarily ρ ∈ D(H), and let C = 〈BB84 ′test(n), ρ〉 and D =
〈Set0˜[q˜].nil, ρ〉. Basically, we only need to compute the total probability of C eventually
performing fail!0 or hacked!0. The reason is, they are the only visible actions of C (D does
not perform any visible action at all), and also the only actions which contribute to possible
transition inconsistency of distributions obtained from C. If the total probability of their
appearance is upper bounded by cn, then C and D are cn-bisimilar.
For each qubit sent by Alice, Eve chooses the wrong basis with probability 1/2, and in
this case if Bob measures this qubit according to the correct basis he will get an incorrect
result with probability 1/2. Thus for each qubit that Bob guesses the correct basis, the
4 Here we adopt a weak notion of security: by secure we mean the eavesdropper ends up with a false key
string. A stronger and more practical notion of security should take into account the mutual information
between the keys held by the legitimate parties and the eavesdropper. We leave the analysis of BB84
with respect to this notion of security for future work.
Y. Feng and M. Ying 453
probability that Alice and Bob get different key bits is 1/4. Furthermore, for each i-length
raw key generated by the basic BB84, Alice and Bob will compare i/2 key bits during the
eavesdropper-detection phase. The probability that they fail to detect the eavesdropper is
then (3/4)i/2. Note that only when the eavesdropper is not detected, the protocol proceeds.
Hence the probability of observing fail!0 or hacked!0 is upper bounded by
n∑
i=0
∑
x˜∈{0,1}i
(
n
i
)
2n+i (3/4)
i/2 = 12n
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(3/4)i/2 = cn.
7 Conclusion and Future work
In this paper, we have proposed a novel notion of distribution-based bisimulation for quantum
processes in qCCS. In contrast with previous bisimulations introduced in the literature, our
definition is reasonably weaker in that it equates some intuitively bisimilar processes which
are not bisimilar according to the previous definitions, thus is more useful in applications.
We further defined a bisimulation distance to characterise the extent to which two processes
are bisimilar. As an application, we applied the notions of distribution-based bisimulation
and bisimulation distance to show that the quantum key distribution protocol BB84 is sound
and secure against the intercept-resend attacker. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first time in the literature that the (asymptotic) security of BB84 has been analysed in the
framework of a quantum process algebra.
There are still many questions remaining for further study. Firstly, as pointed out in
Section 6, the notion of security we adopted for the analysis of BB84 is a rather weak one. In
quantum information field, people normally use the mutual information between the states
held by legitimate parties and the eavesdropper to quantify the leakage of secure information.
To perform a security analysis of BB84 in terms of this stronger notion of security and against
more complex model of attack beyond the intercept-resend one studied in the current paper
is one of the future directions we are pursuing.
Secondly, bisimilarity checking is usually a very tedious and routine task which can barely
be done by hand. This issue becomes more serious when the number of parties involved and
the round of communications increase. To deal with this problem, making the process algebra
approach more applicable for the analysis of general quantum cryptographic protocols, we
are going to develop a software tool for automated bisimilarity checking. In the theoretical
aspect, we will explore the possibility of extending symbolic bisimulation proposed in [12] to
distribution-based case, to decrease the computational complexity of determining bisimilarity.
Finally, as shown in [9], distribution-based bisimulation is not a congruence in general,
unless restricted to distributed schedulers. However, as argued by the authors of [9], non-
distributed schedulers, which are responsible for the incongruence, are actually very unrealistic
and do not appear in real-world applications. To show that our distribution-based bisimulation
is a congruence for qCCS processes under distributed schedulers and to study the implication
of distributed schedulers for quantum cryptographic protocols are also topics worthy of
further consideration.
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